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Abstract 
 
Many funtions like infrastructure and resource management in Latin 
America are governed by the state, but lately there seems to be a shift in 
governance in favor for private actors. One example where this is seen is in 
the city of Guayaquil, Ecuador where a privatization of the water market has 
taken place by the signing of a 30 year long concession contract between the 
state owned authority EMAPAG-EP, La Empresa Municipal de Agua 
Potable y Alcantarillado de Guayaquil - Empresa Pública, and the private 
company Interagua. The shift in management has brought profit interests 
into the local water market, and has contributed to increase the control and 
power for Interagua, where the same has decreased for the state. In addition, 
it is possible to see a stronger influence of neo-liberal governmentality in 
the water market today than before due to this shift. Even though Interagua 
has improved the water situation in Guayaquil there are still remaining 
problems. This makes it difficult for individual households to obtain 
updated information about the quality of the tap water and to trust the 
authorities and their information. Therefore, the households have to use 
their own knowledge and draw from their previous understanding of the 
water problems as well as develop different strategies to reassure that they 
can obtain potable water. This opens up space for private sellers of water 
purification systems to operate, make profit and reinforce the old 
perceptions regarding unpotable tap water. The sellers‟ arguments and 
information of why someone needs a purification system is not regulated 
and highly questionable. This thesis explores how selected households 
perceive their water situation, and how their knowledge and understanding 
of it can be connected to the private sellers‟ business and the overall shift in 
governance between EMAPAG-EP and Interagua.   
 
Keywords: Tap water, privatization, concession contract, governmentality, 
water strategy, Guayaquil, Ecuador. 
 
 
4 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis has been possible to write thanks to many people in Ecuador and 
Sweden. I would like to express my deepest gratitude to you.  
Luis Dominguez for hosting me at ESPOL, La Escuela Superior Politécnica 
del Litoral, 
David Matamoros, Fransisco Torres and Indira Yadira Nolivos Alvarez for 
being my contact persons at ESPOL, La Escuela Superior Politécnica del 
Litoral, and for helping me to arrange several interviews, 
Marino Guala Alvarado, for being my driver and taking me safely to 
various locations in Guayaquil, 
Carmen Menacho, Maria Emilia Mendoza and Milen Arias for being my 
translators in the field, 
Örjan Bartholdson, my supervisor at SLU, The Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences for advice and support throughout the working 
process with this thesis, 
Kjell Hansen and Lousie Arbin from SLU, The Swedish University of 
Agricultural Sciences as my opponents who have contributed with valuable 
feedback, 
the interviewees for their time and willingness to participate and, 
my family and friends for their endless support during this working process, 
both in Ecuador and Sweden. 
Thank you. 
Uppsala, Sweden, September 2018. 
Josephine Biro 
5 
Table of contents 
1. Introduction .............................................................................................. 9 
1.1 Objective and research questions ........................................................... 11 
1.2 Theoretical perspectives ......................................................................... 12 
        1.2.1 Hermeneutics and structuration ............................................................ 12 
        1.2.2 Governmentality .................................................................................... 14 
        1.2.3 Globalisation, neo-liberalism and accumulation by dispossession  ....... 15 
1.3 Methodology .......................................................................................... 16 
1.3.1 How the study came about  .................................................................... 16 
1.3.2 Data collection and sampling ................................................................. 18 
1.3.3 Data analysis and interpretation ............................................................. 21 
2. Findings from case study ....................................................................... 22 
2.1 The privatization of the water market in Guayaquil .............................. 22 
2.2 Strategies for obtaining potable water.................................................... 27 
2.3 Target groups and their understandings of the water situation .............. 30 
        2.3.1 Individual households ............................................................................ 30 
        2.3.2 Sellers and their companies .................................................................... 36 
        2.3.3 Governing actors Interagua and EMAPAG-EP ..................................... 41 
3. Discussion ................................................................................................ 47 
3.1 Understanding the households ............................................................... 47 
3.2 Governmentality in Guayaquil‟s water market ...................................... 52 
3.3 What does privatization mean? .............................................................. 56 
4. Conclusion ............................................................................................... 61  
5. References ............................................................................................... 63 
6. Appendix 1 .............................................................................................. 67 
6 
Table of figures
Figure 1. Ecuador - location in South America............................................ 22 
Figure 2. Ecuador - land map ....................................................................... 22 
Figure 3. Map - households .......................................................................... 67 
Figure 4-5. Photos of tap water after a sales meeting .................................. 68 
Figure 6-8. Taps, tanks and purifications systems ....................................... 69 
7 
Abbreviations 
ARCA    Agencia de Regulación y Control del Agua 
ECAPAG         La Empresa Cantonal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de 
   Guayaquil 
EMAPAG-EP  La Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de 
   Guayaquil - Empresa Pública 
ESPOL    La Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral 
SENAGUA    Secretaría del Agua  
SLU    The Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences 
8 
9 
1. Introduction
Difficulties with accessing potable tap water has for a long time been a 
problem for the people living in Guayaquil, Ecuador. Before 2001, the 
public authority EMAPAG-EP, La Empresa Municipal de Agua Potable y 
Alcantarillado de Guayaquil - Empresa Pública, had the responsibility for 
all water infrastructure as well as cleaning and distributing water to the end 
users, namely households and industries in Guayaquil. Due to a chaotic 
water management and distribution at this time, where water did not reach 
all parts of Guayaquil, and even if it did there was uncertainty about the 
water quality, EMAPAG-EP needed alternatives in order to improve the 
situation. Therefore, a concession contract was announced which the private 
company Interagua gave a bid for. In 2001 the concession contract was 
formulated and signed by the two actors with a validity of 30 years 
(ECAPAG and International Water Interagua CIA. LTDA, 2001, Inter-
American Development Bank, 2006). This meant that Interagua, with 
financial support from the World Bank and the Inter-American 
Development Bank, privatized the water market and took over the 
responsibility for all water related services in Guayaquil (Swyngedouw, 
2005. Hall and Lobina, 2002). In this process EMAPAG-EP became a 
regulatory authority with control functions to secure that Interagua 
improved the water services according to the concession contract. This is a 
unique situation in Ecuador since it is only in Guayaquil that this type of 
private management regarding water services is to be found (Matamoros 
Garcia. D, et al,. 2013). 
A state owned actor like EMAPAG-EP has functioned as a counterpart 
versus Interagua in order to govern the development of water services. Even 
though EMAPAG-EP regulates and controls Interagua in a correct way, the 
shift in governance has meant that the power, assets and control from the 
state has decreased in favor of letting in a private actor to the local water 
market. Involving a private actor like Interagua seems to have been the only 
option for improvement since EMAPAG-EP was out of other alternatives of 
   10 
 
how to improve the situation alone. This has led to a development of the 
water infrastructure and an improved water situation, but it has also brought 
a form of neo-liberal governmentality as will be discussed in this thesis. It 
has therefore had implications for the governing actors EMAPAG-EP and 
Interagua but also for the water users, namely households in Guayaquil, and 
how they understand their water situation. 
 
Even though the water situation has improved substantially since the time 
before 2001 there are still remaining problems with water supply and the 
quality of the tap water as well as individual perceptions of that the water is 
still not safe to drink. This means that people living in Guayaquil has 
different strategies in order to obtain what they concider to be potable water. 
These strategies are used on a daily basis since people do not believe that 
the tap water is potable, even though Interagua has stated that it is. The 
households in Guayaquil demonstrate a lack of trust for the governing actors 
and the information they provide and it seems to be a lack of sufficient 
information coming from these actors. That people in general lack trust for 
the government is common in the Latin American context as other studies 
have shown (Blind, 2006. World Bank, 2010. Lafuente et. al. 2012) and the 
trust for the water authorites in the case of Guayaquil does not seem to be an 
exception. This means that people has to evaluate the water situation 
themselves and tries to make sense of it by drawing from past understanding 
and lived experiences of water problems when understanding their current 
water situation. This creates an uncertainty and a knowledge gap, since the 
accessible information about tap water and the water situation is scarce and 
distorted.  
 
One of the strategies for obtaining potable water used by the households in 
Guayaquil is to buy a water purification system or filter. These products are 
offered as a solution to the remaining water problems and sold by private 
companies and their sellers that operate without constraints in Guayaquil. 
The sellers provide different explanations and arguments why someone is in 
need of their products and they can do demonstrations, which according to 
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the sellers can show the current level of contamination in the tap water. 
They also argue that their products can help to purify the water. Due to the 
lack of information from EMAPAG-EP and Interagua, as well as the 
distorted information and knowledge gap among the households, theses 
sellers can approach the households and reinforce a picture of the tap water 
as contaminated in order to convince the households that there is a need for 
this type of products. Among the households in Guayaquil some people 
believe the sellers, while others do not. Why there are different responses to 
a seller‟s arguments will be investigated in this thesis as well as the sales 
strategies that the sellers use in order to promote their products. 
This study is framed in the privatization process and the new type of 
governance that is seen in Guayaquil‟s water market. A more direct focus 
will be put on people‟s knowledge and notion of risk, how a knowledge gap 
arise and how it is exploited by commercial actors, i.e. the private sellers of 
water purification systems. This has had various implications for how 
people cope with their water situation, strategies and related practices, but 
also how the roles of EMAPAG-EP and Interagua are understood. 
1.1 Objective and research questions  
Objective  
The objective of this study is to investigate what Interagua‟s entering on the 
local water market in Guayaquil has meant for both Interagua and for 
EMAPAG-EP since this has brought a new form of governance, including 
more private interests today compared with the time before 2001. Also, as 
stated in the introduction there are different strategies that the households 
use in order to assure that they have, what they see, as potable water. One 
strategy is to buy water purification systems and filters from private sellers 
who promise the households that their products can solve the difficulties of 
accessing clean tap water. Therefore, this study explores the relationship 
and interactions between sellers and households with the objective of 
explaining why this relationship exists and what the consequences of it are. 
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In order to do so, it is necessary to first understand what type of information 
and knowledge the households have about their tap water and how they 
interpret the water situation before they are approached by a seller. 
 
Research questions 
The following research questions are explored in this study: 
 
- What are the implications of the privatization of the water market for 
selected households and the governing actors Interagua and 
EMAPAG-EP in the city of Guayaquil? 
- What alternative strategies and practices do households in Guayaquil 
use to access clean and potable water? 
- How does the uncertainty about tap water as well as the scarce and 
distorted information about it affect the households? 
- How do the households act in relation to the insufficient information, 
specifically when being approached by a seller of water purification 
products? 
 
 
1.2 Theoretical perspectives  
1.2.1 Hermeneutics and structuration 
Understanding how and why the households act in the ways they do in order 
to cope with the problems of obtaining clean tap water and how the 
households have developed their strategies to obtain potable water is central 
in this thesis. In order to grasp and contextualize people‟s perception and 
action this study will use the concept of life-worlds. This means that a 
depiction of how the water problems are understood by the people 
themselves will be looked for. In order to explore these life-worlds, I have 
drawn on theories of hermeneutics and structuration.  
 
Hermeneutics deals with how people interpret aspects both within and 
outside their own life-worlds (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). Alvesson and 
Sköldberg (ibid: p. 101) mean that “we glide back and forth between the 
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“old“ aspect imposed on the text in the shape of preunderstandings, and the 
new understanding“1 which in the water situation in Guayaquil has been the
case since the interviewed people has a preunderstanding of the water 
problems, but due to new water problems or improved water services a new 
understaning is being shaped and added to the old understanding of this. 
Also, in order to understand their own current situation, the people draw on 
their past understanding, hence gliding back and forth on this scale of how 
to understand the water problems (Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). Using 
hermeneutics therefore makes it possible to approach the question of how 
the water situation appears to the individual members of households in 
Guayaquil and what the people‟s understanding of this condition is. 
Giddens uses the theory of structuration to explore people‟s intentional and 
pre-reflexive actions and how the aggregated effect of these actions create, 
reproduce and transform structures (Giddens, 1986). Here, I will address 
both how social reproduction and social transformation can affect people‟s 
notions of the state and the private companies. Social reproduction explains 
how social order is “reproduced over time by people continuing to act in 
ways inherited from the past“ (Inglis, 2012, p. 208) whereas social 
transformation explains “how social order is changed by people, 
intentionally or unintentionally, through their interactions“ (Inglis, 2012, p. 
208). Structuration can therefore contribute to the understanding of why the 
households think and act in a specific way regarding potable water and 
actors in the water market. It includes ideas about how experiences, 
structures and institutions affect and frame thoughts and actions taken in 
present time. This becomes important when looking at how the strategies for 
obtainging potable water has been developed, changed and/or maintained 
over time by the households in Guayaquil (Inglis, 2012). 
1.2.2 Governmentality 
The households, sellers and the governing actors Interagua and EMAPAG-
1
 The text is referring to written or spoken words or as acts that create a meaning to us 
(Alvesson and Sköldberg, 2009). 
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EP have different roles and relationships with each other, which means that 
they influence, lead, direct or guide one another. The concession contract in 
itself is a leading and binding document which regulates the relationship 
between Interagua and EMAPAG-EP. In order to understand these 
relationships between the households, the sellers as well as EMAPAG-EP 
and Interagua, I will draw on Foucault‟s concept of governmentality 
(Foucault, 1991) and how it is interpreted by Mitchell Dean (2009). 
Foucault defines governmentality as the “conduct of conduct“ which refers 
to how the discourse and implementation of policies frame and create 
specific forms of interpretations, actions and interactions (Dean, 2009, p. 
17). The policies„ discourses frame and affect people‟s actions, norms and 
values. This means that governance can have a strong impact on how people 
act and understand what is happening around them, and could therefore 
contribute to affect and form the so called life-worlds. In this case it may 
implicate that there is a possibility for the governing actors Interagua and 
EMAPAG-EP to steer and affect norms and practices about tap water that 
the households believe in. In other words, governance may affect human 
conduct strongly and shape the form of rationality of the actors (or at least 
shape what seems rational when guiding many actors or individuals at the 
same time). Dean (2009) argues that the governmentality contributes to our 
expectations and demands that we have on others or ourselves. How one can 
govern or be governed therefore implies questions of power, agency, 
communication, regulation and mechanisms for control. How we as 
individuals think, act and respond to a problem is therefore highly 
influenced by these policies and practices of governance since they have 
contributed to create a discourse for what is being communicated (Dean, 
2009). Governmentality will be used in the analysis in order to highlight 
how EMAPAG-EP and Interagua frame and form the actions of each other 
as well as of household members and the sellers of water purification 
systems. How the sellers try to convince the households into buying their 
products, and therefore exercising governance, will be explored by using the 
theory of governmentality. In addition, how the households respond to this 
by e.g. questioning and even resisting both the information from the 
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authorities and the sellers of water purification systems will be looked into.  
 
1.2.3 Globalisation, neo-liberalism and accumulation by dispossession 
During the last decade space and time has been increasingly compressed on 
a global scale (Baumann, 1998. Blind, 2006). Transportations, 
communications and economic transfers have both become faster and denser 
and the world‟s different markets are closer and more integrated with each 
other. This is due to the late modernity of globalisation and it makes the 
distance between both people and markets smaller (cf. Callinicos, 2009). 
These arguments are demonstrated in the case of Interagua since the 
company is part of the French owned concultancy firm Veolia, but operates 
in the local water market in Guayaquil, Ecuador.  
 
The dominating ideology of the ongoing form of globalisation is neo-
liberalism (ibid). This suggests that economic growth and the intented 
improvements of people‟s well-being is supposed to come from the 
establishment of free markets, free trade, strong private property rights and 
the privatization of public assets. It also implies that political and economic 
development is supposed to be engineered with less involvement from the 
state than previously (Bratton and Denham, 2014). In Guayaquil the state 
owned and public actor EMAPAG-EP was responsible for all water related 
services before 2001. One can therefore say that a state owned monopoly 
was in charge of the water services before, but due to the lack of knowledge 
in this organization, another actor was looked for and Interagua was 
contracted through the concession contract. This has not meant that the 
monopoly is broken, rather that it went from being regulated by the state to 
a private company from abroad. It is therefore of interest to look at this 
development through the lenses of globalisation and neo-liberalism.  
 
Harvey‟s (2006) concepts of uneven geographical development and 
accumulation by dispossession well illustrate the form of global market 
ideology, which is dominant within the ideology of neo-liberalism. Due to 
globalisation it is possible for companies from abroad to penetrate local 
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markets and to position themselves at the same, or at least a similar, level 
and with equal power as the local governments. Ferguson and Gupta (2002) 
are talking about this as a transnational, or neo-liberal, governmentality. 
This is shown by the case of Interagua, since the company is part of the 
international firm Veolia and influences the local outcomes related to water 
governance in Guayaquil. Also, Interagua gained a similar position as 
EMAPAG-EP when the 30 year long concession contract was signed.  
Private companies exist to make profit, and as the theory of accumulation by 
dispossession suggests the assets and the generated profit are not staying 
where they were created, but are moved into a capitalistic commodity 
circulation, leaving little revenue and well-being at the place of origin of 
production (Harvey, 2006). If and how this applies to the topic of the private 
water market in Guayaquil and what consequences it may bring will be 
closer looked at by using these theories. 
1.3 Methodology  
1.3.1 How the study came about 
Thanks to the EuroInkaNet scholarship I had the opportunity to spend six 
months in Guayaquil between October 2017 and March 2018. I was able to 
explore the topic of the private water market when I had arrived in 
Guayaquil and was invited to a friend‟s house for dinner. When I arrived at 
the house the family had a meeting with two sellers who came from a 
company that was selling water purification systems and I was invited to 
listen to their presentation. The sellers were dressed in blue shirts and a tie 
and gave a professional impression. They talked about how contaminated 
the tap water in Guayaquil is and what the consequences can be if one 
drinks this water. They showed various pictures of people that were sick 
with cancer and other serious illnesses, saying that this was caused by 
drinking and using untreated tap water. They made a demonstration of the 
water purification systems that they sold and used a technical device to test 
the water from different taps in the house to show the current level of 
contamination (see figures 4-5 in Appendix 1 for the result of this test). 
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During this meeting the sellers appeared to have knowledge about the water 
situation and had what at the time seemed like reasonable arguments. By 
acting professional a sence of trust could possibly be built up between the 
sellers and the family and I believe that the the sellers therefore strongly 
could insist that the family was in need of their products. The family on the 
other hand also demonstrated to have knowledge by using counterarguments 
and criticising the information. When the family did so, the sellers referred 
back to the photos of sick people and often glanced at the glass of water 
where the divice had been put, now showing a mix of water and something 
black at the top and bottom of the glass. Later the family explained to me 
that the water test that the sellers performed was false, they did not trust in 
the results of it and there was nothing wrong with their tap water. This 
situation made me take a critical stance towards both the sellers and the 
family: Who was right and who had the right knowledge regarding the tap 
water? Did the sellers try to scare the family by showing pictures of sick 
people and performing the test and thereby convincing them into buying 
their products?  
After doing a literature review of the water situation in Guayaquil and 
knowing more about the privatization of the water market in 2001 through 
the concession contract, I decided to frame the study in terms of water 
governance. The sellers and households beacame an entrance to this subject 
and it became possible to study the social and cultural concequences of bad 
water quality and how households cope with this situation. This was done 
since I had been part of the sales meeting explained above as well as I knew 
that the privatization of water services has only been seen in Guayaquil and 
not in other Ecuadorian cities (Matamoros Garcia. D, et al,. 2013) which 
made this topic interesting for me. 
In addition, living in Guayaquil and not drinking the tap water myself made 
me understand at a deeper level what a struggle it is for the households to 
obtain potable water as well as to gain sufficient and trustworthy 
information about it. The interviewees and I have shared the same problem 
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and been in the same environment. By combining my personal experiences 
and trying to understand people from various households and using the life-
world concept it has been possible to interpret how people view their actions 
and thoughts related to water access. I believe this has been beneficial for 
the study. 
1.3.2 Data collection and sampling 
The data collection in this study has been of qualitative nature and 
conducted through semi structured interviews and participant observations 
in the field. This has allowed me to explore and at a deeper level understand 
the perspectives given by the interviewees. It has been possible to be 
flexible and to bring out what has been important and meaningful for the 
individual interviewee and by that picturing the complexity of the current 
water situation in Guayaquil (Creswell, 2009). In total 20 interviews were 
carried out with the following target groups and distribution: Households 
(13 interviews), sellers or representatives from companies that sell water 
purification systems (4 interviews) and governing actors (referring to 
Interagua and EMAPAG-EP, 3 interviews). 
I did not know anyone in Guayaquil before the study started and hence the 
sampling of interviewees was difficult initially. However, once I got to 
know people I started interviewing them and the people they lived with. By 
doing so, it was possible to categorize groups of people into households. In 
this study, an individual household is therefore defined as people living 
together in the same house or apartment, either as a family or as a group of 
friends.  
Many of the households that I have interviewed labeled themselves as 
middle class (used as an emic term). Some etic observations supporting this 
are that all visited households live in houses or apartments with well 
constructed walls and roofs, the home itself is well furnished and has a 
range of different electronics e.g. televisions, smart phones and computers.  
   19 
 
They are owners of one or several cars and have knowledge about foreign 
countries, either by visits or having extended family abroad. As in other 
social classes, there is a lower and upper division.  In the Ecuadorian 
context and specifically observed in this case is that is it common for the 
upper middle class to have a pool in the garden or live in a gated community 
where one has to go through a guard post before entering the house or 
apartment. In addition, some households have also been able to employ a 
person from outside the family, working as a gardener or housekeeper. 
These observations give indications of an economic pre-eminence which 
distinguishes these middle class households from lower social and economic 
classes. 
 
Choosing households that referred to themselves as middle class has from a 
methodological point of view been beneficial. It was easy for me to get in 
touch with them and since they could refer me to similar households a 
snowball sampling could be put to practice. Also, since the study has 
focused on the household and seller interaction, it has been of importance to 
include households that have had the economic capacity to buy purification 
systems from the sellers. Focusing on the middle class can in addition be a 
strength since this group is growing around the world but often forgotten in 
case studies like this due to the priority given to other groups of people 
(Favero, 2005. Hannerz, 2016). 
 
The size of the households varied between 2-8 people. A map was created to 
visualize where in Guayaquil the households lived. Even though it was 
difficult to account for the interviewees‟ background the map made it 
possible to assert that they were living in different parts of the city (see 
figure 3 in Appendix 1). This has been of importance since problems with 
the tap water vary with geographical location and due to the fact that sellers 
work in different parts of the city at different times. The interviews with the 
households meant that I met the entire household in their home when they 
could receive me. If a meeting with the entire household was not possible I 
met with one member of the household, either in the home or another place 
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that suited him or her. Carrying out some of the interviews in the 
household‟s own home made it possible to observe taps, tanks, water 
purification systems and filters that were used on a daily basis (see figures 
6-8 in Appendix 1). These interviews lasted between 15-45 minutes 
depending on the interviewee‟s information and interest in the topic.  
 
When it comes to the sampling of sellers and representatives from Interagua 
and EMAPAG-EP I received recommendations from my contact persons at 
ESPOL, La Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral, concerning whom I 
could meet with. My contact persons also helped me to arrange these 
interviews. The interviews with sellers from private companies and 
representatives from Interagua and EMAPAG-EP took place at their offices 
and lasted between 45-90 minutes. These interviews were in depth-
interviews and longer compared with the households since the interviewees 
were well-grounded in the topic and had a lot of information regarding 
water governance, water distribution and sales strategies. These interviews 
included demonstrations of the water purification systems and filters as well 
as showing maps over the water distributions system, treatment plants and 
statistics over water flows and quality.  
 
All interviews were recorded and held in either English or Spanish. For the 
interviews held in Spanish I was accompanied by a translator to reassure I 
could understand everything even though I have basic knowledge of the 
language. Working with a translator meant that I did not have the same 
control over the conversation and that some things got lost in translation. 
However, due to the fact that I listened several times to the recordings and 
could translate the parts in Spanish it was possible to account for this. Also, 
I worked with three translators in order to be more flexible and enable that 
the interviews could be done since many of the interviewees confirmed the 
interview with short notice. The translators had different interest in the topic 
and different knowledge of the English language. These things could have 
had implications for the results. In order to account for this I briefed the 
translators in the same way before each interview and also talked with them 
   21 
 
afterwards. In addition, a field diary has been used in order to write down 
reflections after each interview and all interviews have been transcribed and 
summarized.  
 
1.3.3 Data analysis and interpretation 
The data analysis has been done by listening to the recorded interviews 
several times, first in a chronological order and later target group by target 
group (i.e. households, sellers, governing actors). Sorting the material by 
different themes and highlighting informative quotes in the transcribed 
material facilitated the analysis (Öhlander, 2011). Comparing similarities 
and differences within the target groups as well as between the target groups 
made it possible to see different perspectives and perceptions. By reviewing 
the themes and quotes in the transcribed material and drawing from a 
combination of theoretical perspectives (presented in the previous chapter) 
an analysis and interpretation could be done. 
 
It should be stated that many different people have been involved in this 
study and the stories about water are just as many as there are individuals.
2
 
These stories are unique for each person, which means that thoughs about 
water varies grately and are personal. During the fieldwork, I have 
perceived the situation in terms of water access and management of the 
water services as highly caotic and disorganized. However, in order to 
describe this in this thesis, I have had to summarize and draw on the main 
understandings of this. Therefore, this thesis might depict the situations as 
more organized than what is perceived in reality. At the same time, the 
intention of this study is not to generalize the results on a broader scale. The 
results cannot be representative for the entire civil society in Guayaquil 
since the numbers of interviews are too small and geographically restricted. 
Instead, by listening attentively and analysing the narratives of selected 
households, sellers and the main actors in the field of water governance in 
Guayaquil, this study aims at highlighting how these actors perceive the 
                                                          
2
 All interviews represent 57 individuals in total. There are additional and informal 
conversations that have contributed to a general understanding of the water situation in 
Guayaquil, but these are not included as primary data. 
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main problems surrounding the water supply, particularly the alleged lack of 
clean water, and how these perceptions inform and contribute to the 
strategies and practices pursued by the actors. 
2. Findings from case study
2.1 The privatization of the water market in Guayaquil 
Ecuador‟s largest city is called Guayaquil and has a population of around 
2,5 million people (PSIRU, 2018).  Here, population growth has taken place 
at a high rate: in 1890 the population was around 45 000 and hundred years 
later it reached around 1, 65 million people (Hidalgo,1932. INEC, 1990. 
Swyngedouw, 2004). Even though Quito is the capital of Ecuador, 
Guayaquil is referred to as the motor in the national economy and presents 
new opportunities for people in terms of jobs and market related activities 
(NE, 2017 A). The city is located at the Pacific coast in the south of 
Ecuador. This geographical location means that daily temperatures often 
reach 30 degrees Celsius.  
Figure 1: Ecuador, location in  Figure 2: Ecuador, land map. 
South America. Source: NE, 2017 B. Source: NE, 2017 B. 
In this hot city potable water has historically been difficult to obtain. Going 
back in history to the 1990´s, Swyngedouw (1995 B) was referring to the 
situation as ironical: water was flowing through Guayaquil in Río Guayas 
(the Guayas River), but almost half of the inhabitants did not have access to 
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adequate or reliable sources of potable water. Water distribution systems 
and pipes are still today often over 50 years old, sometimes even nearly 100 
years old, which means that they are fragile and vulnerable. Hence, the 
distribution system is not trustworthy: it can break, create leakages, clean 
water can be mixed with sewage water and the rusty pipes can contaminate 
the water before reaching the end consumers. 
As mentioned earlier, the population growth has taken place at a high rate 
and the fact that Guayaquil is the motor in the national economy makes the 
city attractive for migrants. This has caused a strong movement of 
urbanization with a large increase of people moving to the suburbs and 
growing outskirts of the city. The existing water systems in these areas are 
not sufficient for people living there and the continuous urbanization has put 
more stress on water supply and infrastructure as Swyngedouw (1995 A, p. 
317) states: “population growth [has] outstripped the expansion of the
water network”. Work by Swyngedouw (1995 A, 1995 B, 2004) and The 
Inter-American Development Bank (2006) have shown that it is the poorest 
people living in these areas that pay the highest price for this migration, 
both socially and economically, and that there are large inequalities between 
poor and rich people in terms of water access. It is the poorest people living 
in the outskirts of Guayaquil with the least developed water infrastructure 
and least reliable water access that pay higher prices for their water as well 
as being less water secure compared to people living in the city with well 
functioning and cheaper water services (Swyngedouw, 1995 A, 1995 B, 
2004. The Inter-American Development Bank (2006). 
The water systems include provision and distribution of drinking water as 
well as sewage systems. The latter has been said to be on the verge of a 
collapse in Guayaquil (Swyngedouw, 1995 B). Decades of political 
instability and underinvestment from the government led to a dependency 
on external financing, often coming from international and private 
companies (NE, 2017 B). In the case of Guayaquil, the private company 
Interagua gained the concession contract in 2001 (ECAPAC and 
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International Water Interagua CIA. LTDA, 2001. Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2006). Interagua is part of the French owned consulting 
firm Veolia (Interagua, 2017) and provides services related to water and 
waste management and claims to be a “global leader in optimized resource 
management” (Veolia, 2017). The concession contract that Interagua gained 
meant that a 30 year long contract was signed and led to that Interagua, 
instead of municipality (in the form of the public company EMAPAG-EP
3
)
took over and now handles the risks, maintenance and administration of all 
potable water and sewage services in Guayaquil (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2006). In addition, a concession contract means that the 
water infrastructure still belongs to the municipality but is rented and 
operated by the private actor who is, according to specific targets regulated 
in the concession contract, responsible for improvements and investments 
for maintenance and expansion of the system (Sjölander Holland, 2005). 
This type of contract is the most common way to introduce private actors 
into the water market (Segerfeldt, 2005). 
This situation is unique in Ecuador since it is only in Guayaquil that the 
water services are taken care of by a private actor alone (Matamoros Garcia. 
D, et al,. 2013). When the concession contract was announced it was only 
Interagua that gave a bid and hence there was no competition in terms of 
obtaining the contract (Swyngedouw, 2004. PSIRU, 2018) and when it was 
formulated many of the workers from EMAPAG-EP were dismissed from 
their jobs but later rehired or trained by Interagua (Swyngedouw, 2004). 
Similar development with privatization of the water market has occured in 
other Latin American countries, for example in Bolivia and Argentina. Here, 
private companies have easily won the contracts due to the low competition, 
lack of sufficient governance and strong regulators as well as the urgent 
need to improve the water services. In Cochabamba, Bolivia the situation 
got serious in the year 2000 when the improvements of the water system 
3
 Before the concession contract EMAPAG-EP was called ECAPAG (La Empresa Cantonal 
de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Guayaquil), and was at the time a cantonal company. It 
later changed into a public municipal company under the name of EMAPAG-EP 
(EMAPAG-EP, 2018 A). 
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through privatization led to a rapid increase of the water prices: on average 
the prices for the poorest people rose by 43% and for the upper middle class 
by 57%. Examples of increases of prices up to 400% have also been 
observed (Sjölander Holland, 2005. Segerfeldt, 2005). This was something 
that the people could not afford and massive protests and violent 
confrontations broke out in the so called “Water War in Cochabamba”. This 
strong civil reaction led to a cancellation of the contract and that the public 
actors had to regain the responsibility over the water services (Sjölander 
Holland, 2005. Segerfeldt, 2005). 
There are different opinions wether water privatization is beneficial or not. 
According to Sjölander Holland (2005) governments in the global South are 
being strongly advised, and almost forced, into privatization of their water 
services when they are being granted loans for development from 
international institutions. Also, loans from international institutions to the 
private actors can contribute to make these actors economically stronger 
compared to the local governments. This means that the international 
institutions granting the loans have much power and can influence the terms 
and conditions, leaving little space for the governments to have their voices 
heard. Direct loans to the private side have been observed in the case of 
Guayaquil since the Inter-American Development Bank gave a loan to 
Interagua in 1997 in order to prepare the privatization. By this loan, 20 
million US dollar was given in order to facilitate the privatization processes 
and the same amount of money was given for initial investments 
(Swyngedouw, 2005. Hall and Lobina, 2002). In addition, the World Bank 
gave a security guarantee worth 18 million US dollars to Interagua when 
they became a part of the concession contract in 2001. This was supposed to 
cover political risks and potential economic losses in Ecuador and to create 
a performance bond
4
 (Swyngedouw, 2005. Hall and Lobina, 2002).
4
 A performance bond is a sort of economical guarantee, which in this case means that 
Interagua was granted money from the World Bank with a promise to complete the 
constructions and water projects in Guayaquil, i.e. promising to performe according to the 
contract in exchange of money (The World Bank, 2004). 
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Letting in private actors can in the end be expensive and it is often the 
people that has to pay for this type of development by raised water prices, 
which they may not be able to afford. The high prices can lead to an 
increased inequality where the poorest people are left behind with little or 
no improvement regarding their water services, for example as seen in the 
situation in Cochabamba, Bolivia (Sjölander Holland, 2005). Also, the fact 
that the water market today is dominated by two private actors, Veolia and 
Suez that together hold more than two thirds of the private water market, 
makes it difficult for other companies to compete and offer alternatives in 
this market (Sjölander Holland, 2005. Swyngedouw, 2005). Perhaps it is not 
surprising that it was only Interagua that gave a bid for the concession 
contract since the company is part of Veolia and therefore had a strong 
market position and little competition to start with. 
On the other hand, Segerfeldt (2005) is explaining why privatization is the 
preferred option when it comes to improving water systems and solving a 
water crisis. He argues that “the greater the involvement of the private 
sector in water supply, the greater the number of people with access to 
water” (Segerfeldt, 2005, p. 61). This is explained by that private actors 
have bigger resources like money and technical knowledge to improve the 
water services and that the private actors often know better than the public 
ones how to govern an organization and can hence be more efficient. In 
addition, the private actors are not bound to a political agenda as the public 
actors are which can be beneficial for their performance (Segerfeldt, 2005). 
In Ecuador the new constitution from 2009 has prohibited water 
privatization which means that the current concession contract between 
Interagua and EMAPAG-EP is not valid after the 30 year long period (i.e. 
after 2031). Up until today there have been demands for a termination of the 
concession contract from local authorities and people living in Guayaquil. 
The complaints have mainly been related to costs and quality, and that 
Interagua has not kept their part of the contract in these aspects (PSIRU, 
2018). Regardless if privatization is good or bad, preferred or not, the 
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following chapters in this thesis aims at exploring what the consequences of 
the privatization of the water market in Guayaquil has brought for the 
involved actors as well as the water end users, namely the households in 
Guayaquil. 
2.2 Strategies for obtaining potable water 
According to the interviewees from Interagua and EMAPAG-EP, the 
privatization of the water market in Guayaquil has led to improvements e.g. 
in terms of a continuous flow of water, cleaning processes, water pressure as 
well as a more modern way to operate the distribution system. However, 
there are still remaining problems with water access and people in 
Guayaquil need to depend on different strategies for obtaining potable 
water. This study has through a literature review, observations and 
interviews with selected households in Guayaquil found five strategies that 
people use in order to obtain what they themselves see as clean and potable 
water: 
1. Water trucks: Where one does not know if there is going to be water
in the tap or not, or there are no pipes (usually in the outskirts of the
city), people depend on water trucks, so called tanqueros. The water
that the tanqueros are selling is often the same water that has been
cleaned by Interagua, but due to the distribution problems in these
parts of the city, the water cannot reach the households. The
tanqueros thus act as intermediaries and charge high prices. The
main contradiction is that many poor people in the suburbs have to
obtain their water in this way and pay higher prices compared to if
they could access water directly through the tap or would live in
another part of the city (Swyngedouw, 1995 A, B).
2. Boiling tap water: If one can access water in the tap, but it is not
considered potable, one can boil the tap water in order to assure that
contaminants are eliminated. A problem with this is that the
distribution system can break, or the water flow can be interrupted or
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turned off when reparation work is needed for the pipes, leaving 
these households without this option in terms of water access. 
Households can prepare for these situations if they receive 
information about the water cut in advance and can afford a cisterna, 
a storage tank for extra water. Another problem is that even though 
the water has been boiled, it might not be enough to eliminate micro 
bacteria or other contaminants that can survive the 100 degrees 
Celsius boiling point. According to INEC ‟s statistical survey from 
2010 in which over one million households in the Guayas region 
participated, this strategy of boiling the water is practiced by almost 
half of the households in the survey (49,3%).  This result suggests 
that this strategy is the most common one for obtaining potable 
water in the Guayas region (INEC, 2010). 
3. Using chlorine: Similar to strategy number two, if there is water in
the tap but it is not considered to be potable, one can put chlorine in
it to purify it before using or drinking it. According to the same
survey by INEC (2010) as mentioned above, this is done by almost
5% of the households participating in the survey. Putting chlorine
into the drinking water requires that one has knowledge of how to
handle the chemical as well as being aware of the risks and health
related issues that can come with it. In addition, it should be
mentioned that the water that is cleaned by Interagua and distributed
in Guayaquil already has chlorine in it.
4. Buying bottled water: To buy purified water at the supermarket or
convenience store in large containers or bottles is another strategy. It
is practiced by people who live in the city or near a store, which
means that the burden of transporting the heavy water containers to
one‟s home can be manageable (done by a quarter of the households
according to the INEC survey (2010)). However, it still requires
water planning and creates a dependency for the store. In the long
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run it can also be expensive and the plastic bottles can create another 
problem in terms of recycling. 
5. Using purification systems and filters: If one can afford to make an
investment, it is possible to buy a purification system to the home
which can be installed in all, or selected, taps. The price varies
depending on how many systems are installed and on how advanced
the filter or cleaning system itself is. To give an indication, prices
between 300 US dollars for the simplest installations in one tap up to
4000 US dollars for an advanced system installed in all taps in a
home have been observed in this study
5
. There are private companies
that operate in Guayaquil which have specialized in selling and
installing this equipment in the individual households‟ homes. The
strategy of filtering the water like this is the least common strategy
among households in the Guayas region (only done by 1,4%
according to the survey by INEC (2010)). One possible explanation
for this is that the systems are expensive and require an investment
and is hence not accessible for households with a low economic
status. Another explanation, which will be discussed later on, is that
some households do not consider the systems as necessary or
trustworthy even if they can afford them. In these cases they practice
one of the strategies mentioned above since they lack trust for the
sellers or for the functions of such a system.
Households can alter between different strategies or use several strategies at 
the same time in order to become more water secure. However, what one 
can conclude from these strategies is that water is commodified and sold in 
various ways in Guayaquil. It also shows the different prices, efforts and 
levels of knowledge a household has to deal with on a daily basis in order to 
5
 The minimum wage for a contracted person who works full time in Ecuador, the so called 
Salario Básico Unificado 2018, is 386 USD per month (El Universo, 2017. Ministerio del 
Trabajo, 2017).  To this minimum wage additional benefits and incomes can be added, 
landing on a monthly wage of 450 USD for one person (INEC, 2018). Hence buying a 
purification system can be expensive, and often requires an economic investment. 
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obtain potable water. It also gives a hint at that water access and economic 
status are related to each other. 
 
Previous research (mainly done by Swyngedouw since the 1990‟s) about the 
tanqueros has demonstrated their organization and ways of operation, with 
inequalities among the people in Guayaquil and a dependency for the 
tanqueros as the results. However, due to a personal interest as well as the 
lack of previous research in the area, this study has focused on how the 
private companies and sellers of water purification systems and filters 
operate and approach their customers, namely the households in Guayaquil 
and how they respond to this. By having this focus, it is possible to question 
the level of knowledge and information that the households and sellers have. 
Since this is a unique situation in Guayaquil compared to the rest of 
Ecuador, the governing actors Interagua and EMAPAG-EP have been 
included in this study too. Including them allows for a deeper understanding 
of how the situation has developed as well as what the consequences are for 
households and sellers in Guayaquil today. In order to understand this, the 
narratives from these three target groups will be presented in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
2.3 Target groups and their understandings of the water situation 
2.3.1 Individual households  
None of the households interviewed in this study drink the water directly 
from the tap untreated and they explain that the tap water is used for 
cleaning, washing the clothes and dishes, cooking food or personal hygiene. 
When it comes to the potable water they either boil the tap water, buy water 
in big bottles at the supermarket or convenience store or has a purification 
system installed in the home that the tap water goes through before drinking 
it. When it comes to boiling the water there are different reason and length 
of time when doing this. In some cases they explain that bacteria and 
contaminants are eliminated when the water is boiled, but exactly at what 
time this happens is unknown. Therefore, different households boil the 
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water for different lengths of time, ranging from a few minutes up to an 
hour. Also, explanations of what type of bacteria or contaminants there are 
and how that could reach the tap water varies: the water is already 
contaminated when it is taken up by Interagua in Río Daule (Daule River, 
the catchment area) and La Toma (the treatment plant) and is not cleaned 
properly, the rusty pipes contaminate the water on the way from the 
catchment area and treatment plant to the houses, the pipes break and mix 
clean water with sewage water because the distribution system is old and 
weak, there are animals, plants or mould inside the pipes that generate micro 
bacteria or that there are too high levels of chlorine or iron in the tap water 
are common explanations. One man working at an educational center in 
Guayaquil explained the following: 
“You cannot drink the water. All the pipes are under the city and it is 
normal for me that a lot of bacteria and animals and things are there. I 
would not trust that they [Interagua] are doing this job to keep the pipes 
clean. I don’t know, but as far as I know the pipes are made of cement. So 
the cement and the water all the time, it becomes like when the water is not 
moving, you know this green, it is like a plant or something in the water.” 
An additional answer for boiling the water is that the household has always 
done so and it is a habit. Many individuals within the households say that 
they have been taught by their parents or in school to always boil the water, 
something that they still do today as adults even though they do not know 
why or if there is a need to do it. There are also many people who confirm 
that there is information about the current water situation and improvements 
done by Interagua and EMAPAG-EP – information which suggests that the 
tap water is of good quality and potable without any further treatments. 
However, members of the households argue that it is difficult to obtain the 
information or that they do not pay attention to this information, e.g. there is 
no need to frequently check the latest improvements, they forget about the 
water problems if they seldom occur or they look for entertainment and not 
facts during their free time. Several persons have referred to themselves and 
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people in Guayaquil in general as lazy. They say that it might be a problem 
with the culture and norms, since people cannot always explain why they 
still practice their old habits, e.g. boiling the tap water. In addition, several 
members of the households have expressed that they are unhappy with this 
habit since it is time consuming and requires planning. Therefore, a desire to 
change it exists, but still it seems like few individuals actively search for 
information on how to do it. A young man in his late 20‟s who studies at 
ESPOL, La Escuela Superior Politécnica del Litoral, framed it in the 
following way: 
 
“Maybe the problem is me, because I do not search information about it 
[the current water situation], but I think I should do it. This is the problem 
of people in Guayaquil, ellos son así, that is the way they are, it is in our 
culture to not search information.” 
 
Another problem is that even if the information is available it is seldom that 
the people believe in it. There seems to be a lack of trust for EMAPAG-EP 
and Interagua, how they work and that the water distribution system in 
Guayaquil has improved since the concession contract was signed in 2001. 
Hence, the old perceptions of not being able to drink the tap water and habit 
of treating it are still present. Individuals have also said that they would 
show more trust if an international, independent organization without 
economic interests in the question would provide statistics and facts, or if 
national politicians, e.g. the health minister could support and prove that the 
information from Interagua was true. A young man in his 30‟s who is a 
former student at the university, and who is currently employed by the same 
university said the following about Interagua: 
 
“Even if they told me that the water is clean, I think I would continue to boil 
it just to be hundred per cent sure.” 
 
The concession contract between Interagua and EMAPAG-EP states that 
Interagua has the responsibility of cleaning and distributing water in 
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Guayaquil and that EMAPAG-EP shall work as a supervisor and regulatory 
authority to assure that Interagua follows the contract. The households‟ 
knowledge of this varies greatly. Some persons can explain a lot about the 
concession contract and the roles of the actors, facts that correlate with the 
literature review done by this study. Other conceptions that exist but are not 
correct according to the literature or interviews with the governing actors 
are that Interagua is a governmental company, that EMAPAG-EP is 
competing with Interagua or that EMAPAG-EP is the main actor for 
providing water outside Guayaquil. On the other hand, some interviewees 
have never heard of EMAPAG-EP and hence express a need for a 
regulatory authority. 
 
The households have encountered different problems with water distribution 
and water quality. At times Interagua has to cut the water service to do 
reparation work, which means that there is not going to be any water in the 
tap for a few hours up to a day. Individuals from one of the households state 
that they were without tap water for a week. Individuals from several 
households mention that they have a cisterna, a reserve tank which makes 
them less vulnerable to water cuts. In addition, several individuals confirm 
that tanqueros still operate in Guayaquil and sell water.  
 
Water cuts are announced between one to five days in advance through the 
newspapers, news on the TV, social media or by letters and posters in the 
neighbourhood. This means that the people has to pay attention to these 
sources of information in order to avoid being without tap water. However, 
sometimes the water is cut without notice, mostly when the maintenance 
work is planned for less than a few hours or when unexpected problems in 
the distribution systems occur. The frequency of water cuts varies 
depending on what sector Interagua is doing reparation work in. In some 
sectors it happens a few times per year whereas in others it happens every 
second week. The water that comes in the tap can sometimes have a brown 
or white colour. The households speculate about the reasons for this which 
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sometimes becomes contradictory. Three women who are all students in 
economics and are living together explained the following: 
“Sometimes the water comes out with a little white colour, it is not 
transparent… It is just white… We do not know why but would like to know, 
but we do not know who to ask. Some friends have the same situation and 
they say it is too much chlorine put in the water. This always happens at 
night.” 
This is contradicted by the following statement, coming from a sister and 
brother living together in a gated community in the west of Guayaquil: 
“When you open the tap in the morning… El agua es sucia… It is dirty… 
Como café, color café [like a brown colour]. I think it is bad because it is 
dirty. The reason is the treatment plants. They close in the night and the 
plants open in the morning. In the night there is no Cl [chlorine] in the 
water.” 
Low water pressure and bad smell are other problems that the households 
have experienced. Due to the remaining problems with water cleaning and 
distribution as well as the households various perceptions and levels of trust 
regarding this, sellers from private companies operate in and around 
Guayaquil to offer purification systems and filters as a solution to the 
problems. Many households have met these sellers and there are different 
experiences from these encounters. Among the households, three main 
responses to the sellers are found: 
1. People who believe the sellers and hence buy the purification
systems. They believe that the tap water is cleaned sufficiently in the
systems, otherwise they would not have bought them. In some cases
individuals have been approached by sellers or recommended by a
friend and therefore been convinced into buying it. Other times they
have done research about the purification systems and contacted the
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seller unbesought. A strong argument from people in this category is 
that it is more economical to invest in these type of systems than 
buying water bottles from the store since it is in the long run more 
expensive. 
2. People who believe the sellers, but think that the purification systems
are unnecessary and hence continue to boil the tap water or buy it in
bottles from a store. They say that they are happy with the ways they
obtain potable water and would not like to change their strategy by
buying a purification system. It is considered to be unnecessary, and
for some, too expensive.
3. People who think that the sellers are lying and doing fake tests during
the demonstrations and hence do not buy the systems. These people
are the most sceptical ones towards the sellers and they do not believe
the demonstrations or facts provided by them. They say that the
sellers just want to make profit and that they do not have sufficient or
“real” knowledge of the water problems. Instead, they learn a sales
manuscript that they are limited to as well as having a few main
arguments that they use in order to try to sell the products. The
arguments are for some households easy to question or criticize,
which makes them doubt the seller to a high degree. These
households also claim to have better knowledge about the water in
their house than the sellers do. In addition, it is said that having a
purification system or filter is a trend, since it is promoted as being
healthy or environmentally friendly. Critical households explain that
people who want high status buys a purification system or filter
regardless of how well it actually performs, as a young woman living
in the west of Guayaquil explained:
“If you want a position, or to be cool in the healthy trend, then you 
have to have a filter.” 
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Buying a purification system or filter is optional, and as explained above 
there are different responses to this. However, all households have to pay a 
water tariff to Interagua for the basic water services, i.e. cleaning and 
transporting the water to the house. Households in this study have said that 
they consider the water tariff as cheap and that they would react negatively 
if it was raised. This case study found that smaller households (two to four 
people) pay around 8-15 UDS per month and larger ones (five to eight 
people) pay around 25-30 UDS per month for Interagua‟s water service. 
 
2.3.2 Sellers and their companies 
In Guayaquil there are many private companies selling water purification 
systems and filters for domestic cleaning of tap water. This study includes 
four of them: Datasocia, Nikken, Incopartes and Helisa. These companies 
import equipment from abroad, mainly from the United States and sell it 
locally in Guayaquil. Hence, they are functioning as intermediaries in this 
trade. They also build and repair the equipment and therefore offer 
maintenance of the products that they sell. It is common that the companies 
do not only sell water purification systems but also air filters, cleaning 
products or domestic goods. Their potential clients are both individual 
households and the industry e.g. laboratories, hospitals and restaurants. 
However, this study has focused on the interaction and sales to households. 
 
The sellers‟ work is often commission based which means that the more a 
seller sells, the more he or she earns. The educational background is not 
important for becoming a seller since they get specialized training when 
entering the company, e.g. by seminars and courses in sales techniques, 
marketing strategies and how to demonstrate the products. They spend little 
time reflecting on water management, water properties, how Interagua 
cleans the water or what the current situation looks like. Some companies 
encourage their sellers to search for this information themselves. As a result 
of this, misconceptions and lack of knowledge about water in Guayaquil 
became evident during these interviews. For example, one seller explained 
that Interagua sells water to EMAPAG-EP who later distributes and sells it 
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to the household as a way for EMAPAG-EP to make money. Another seller 
argued that Interagua is a state owned company. When asked about what 
type of chemicals are removed from the water and how the purification 
systems and filters work, explanations were vague. 
If the company is big enough it is common to have a store where customers 
can see the products. Other ways to approach customers is to participate in 
fairs or to do visits to the households‟ homes. All sellers who were 
interviewed stated that they visit all parts of Guayaquil, but that they know 
where the water problems most frequently occur and can hence prioritize 
visits to these areas. Customers can also contact the sellers directly, which is 
common if they have been recommended by a friend or family member to 
try the purification systems. Hence, it is also common for the sellers to ask 
their current customer for references or contact details to other people as 
well as asking if he or she can recommend the products to others. In this 
way the sellers and the households create a customer network for the 
company and the company‟s reputation becomes important. 
The sellers argued that their companies are not regulated by any specific 
laws or regulations in Ecuador except the import rules since they function as 
intermediaries and local distributors by importing the equipment from 
abroad. Regulations and requirements for the water quality and chemicals 
used in the treatment of tap water is Interagua‟s responsibility. The sellers, 
as well as Interagua and EMAPAG-EP, confirm that they do not have any 
contact with each other. Nonetheless, the sellers explained that their 
purification systems and filters are needed. The main arguments can be 
summarized as follows:  
- Old distribution systems: Even though Interagua cleans the water
properly, there are still chemical reactions occurring when the clean
water is transported in the old pipes which make the tap water
contaminated before reaching the households.
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- Excess chlorine: Interagua puts more chlorine in the water than 
permitted by the legal limits when the water is being transported 
long distances in the pipes, e.g. when distributing water from La 
Toma in the north to the areas in the south of Guayaquil. In order to 
eliminate excess chlorine the purification systems and filters are 
needed. 
 
- Plastic materials are dangerous: Buying water in plastic bottles has 
negative health implications since the water reacts with the plastic 
and can cause cancer and diabetes when you drink the bottled water. 
 
- Bacteria in the tap water: Even if boiling the tap water up to 100 
degrees Celsius bacteria can survive and in order to eliminate that a 
purification system or filter in needed. 
 
As earlier stated, the households react differently to the sellers‟ arguments. 
Hence, the sellers use different arguments depending on the response from 
the household as well as their knowledge about the water situation. One 
seller explains that it is a lot easier to sell to people who lack knowledge, 
and that he prepares more if he is going to an area of Guayaquil where 
richer people live since he assumes they have a university education and 
more knowledge. Therefore, these people can be more critical of his 
arguments.  
 
It has been possible to identify two main types of sellers who use different 
strategies in order to demonstrate and sell their products. They are referred 
to as the technical seller and the emotional seller and will be described 
below. It is possible that a seller can alter between the two types, but I have 
only met sellers who I have perceived as being either technical or emotional 
in their approaches. 
 
As mentioned, if a seller notices that the household lack information or 
knowledge about their water, the sales are often easier to do. On the other 
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hand, when approaching households that claims to have better knowledge 
and also shows that in the interaction (by counterarguments, critical 
questions etc.), the sales are more difficult and require harder work from the 
seller. One seller says that the main act in these situations is the 
demonstration with the technical device put in the water from various taps 
to show the current level of contamination (see figures 4-5 in Appendix 1). 
Afterwards many people get frightened or understand why a system is 
needed and are hence more willing to buy one. Others claim that these test 
are false and that the seller put different settings for the device, causing a 
chemical reaction in order to convince them into buying the products. The 
sellers‟ response to this is that the test with the device is showing the truth 
and the settings are not manipulated. In addition, these sellers use medical 
and technical terms and explanations in order to sell their products, and are 
therefore referred to as the technical seller in this study. Some households 
have described these sellers as very insistent and even pushy with their 
technical, and often complex, arguments and demonstrations.  
 
The other type of seller defined by this study is referred to as the emotional 
seller, who uses a very different strategy when approaching the households. 
The emotional seller can make visits and demonstrations in the households‟ 
home, but it is more common that the households refer friends and other 
family members to this seller, creating a reputation for the seller by positive 
recommendations. The fact that people have high trust for family and 
friends and their recommendations is beneficial for these sellers, since they 
do not have to gain the trust while demonstrating the purification systems. 
Hence, this seller does not need to be insistent nor technical in a similar way 
as the technical seller since the people are already interested in these sellers‟ 
products. Instead, the emotional seller presents a concept of well-being. This 
includes a philosophy of a natural and balanced life where clean water 
together with good food and good sleep are important for a healthy life. One 
emotional seller coming from the company Nikken explained:  
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“The philosophy is inspired by the five pillars of health: Mentality, body, 
society, family and finances. It is a very natural concept, certified and an 
integrated concept.  Water, air, rest, nutrition and light… If you drink good 
water, rest well and eat well you can prevent sickness… That is protecting 
the body.” 6   
 
One of the emotional sellers talked about the emotional cheque, “cheque 
emocional”, which means that she makes people feel good when they can 
obtain a purification system which is pleasing for both the people and for 
her. However, in terms of knowledge about water and the situation in 
Guayaquil, little is known. This is seen in the interviews since these sellers 
lack the ability to explain why the water is not potable or how the 
purification systems clean the water. One seller says that the systems are 
made of magnetic stones which clean the water, but a more detailed 
explanation cannot be presented. Instead, focus in this type of sales lies in 
the promotion of the well-being concept.  
 
The potential knowledge gap that an emotional seller has can be said to be 
concealed since people trust the recommendations from family and friends 
when buying these purification systems and filters. By that, there is simply 
no need to question the sellers‟ knowledge about water and it does not 
become visible that knowledge is missing. Hence, the emotional seller can 
promote the concept linked to well-being and health rather than using 
technical explanations of why purification systems and filters are needed. In 
contrast to the technical seller, the emotional seller appeals to sense of trust 
and personal relations to persuade the households to buy the purification 
systems. 
 
Both the technical and emotional sellers have argued that they offer 
payment plans for customers paying with credit cards. Customers without 
                                                          
6
 Original quote in Spanish:”La filosofía esta insperada en los cinco pilares de la salud: 
Mente, cuerpo, sociedad, familia y finanzas. Es un concepto muy natural, certificado, un 
concepto integral. Agua, aire, descanso, nutrición, luz…. Si tu tomas una buena agua, 
descansas bien, comes bien, tu previenes enfermedades.. es protección para el cuerpo.” 
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credit cards have to pay cash during the sales meeting. Not all people in 
Guayaquil are owners of a credit card, specifically if one belongs to a low-
income social class. However, the majority of the sellers say that their 
products are available for all types of people. In order to make it easier for 
people with a lower economic status to buy a purification system or filter, 
one seller stated that discounts, special offers and beneficial payment plans 
are given when he sees that someone wants to buy the products but are not 
economically able to. Facilitating the purchases in this way could be a way 
for the sellers to increase their own salary since their work is commission 
based. Also, since the sellers confirm that competition between the 
companies exist to a high degree, the one with the best offers is likely to 
succeed. One of the emotional sellers explains that technical sellers can visit 
houses where she has already sold a purification system. The technical seller 
performs tests on the water coming from the system and tells the household 
that they have been tricked into buying it and afterwards offers them another 
purification system instead. One of the technical sellers also stated that 
sellers of chlorine use false propaganda by saying that the households need 
chlorine and not purification systems or filters in order to clean the water 
properly. Due to this, all sellers included in this study have stated that they 
have an educational role. It is important to make households aware of the 
best methods to make their tap water potable and safe. 
2.3.3 Governing actors Interagua and EMAPAG-EP 
Interviews with representatives from the main governing actors regarding 
water management in Guayaquil are also included in this study. The 
representatives from Interagua were the production manager and the 
commercial manager. Interviewing them allowed for a broader 
understanding of the topic and contributed to give a technical as well as a 
social perspective. The production manager has been working for Interagua 
since the concession contract was signed which contributed to the 
understanding of the general working process by Interagua and how the 
water situation has improved in Guayaquil since 2001. The commercial 
manager has been working for Interagua for two years. Despite having less 
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experience compared to his colleague, the commercial manager could 
provide important information about customer relations, economical 
decisions and the structure of the concession contract. 
 
The representative from EMAPAG-EP is a civil engineer working in the 
technical department with responsibility for planning, controlling and 
monitoring water management projects in Guayaquil. This representative 
has a frequent contact with Interagua and has worked seven years for 
EMAPAG-EP.  
 
Through the concession contract a privatization of the water management 
took place and both EMAPAG-EP and Interagua refer to Interagua as 
having a monopoly on all water related services in Guayaquil. The 
representative from EMAPAG-EP has argued that it is an advantage to have 
a private company in charge of water management because they can do 
investments, propose new technology and EMAPAG-EP can still regulate 
them in order to assure improvements. The reasons for privatizing the water 
services were that the distribution systems before 2001 were bad, there was 
a lack of control and regulation and EMAPAG-EP wanted to be able to 
guarantee a continuous flow of water to the households. Similar 
explanations are given by the representatives from Interagua. In addition, 
they explain what the situation looked like before 2001: there was no water 
flowing to the southern parts of Guayaquil; pipes in the ground were not 
mapped, movement of water in the main pipes was difficult, there were 
many leaks in the systems and low pressure and low flow of water was very 
common. Some parts of the city had water services for only ten hours per 
day. The representatives from Interagua alleged that they started with very 
challenging conditions but won the concession contract since they were the 
company that could provide the highest number of new water connections 
and reach continuity of service during the first five years, i.e. meet the 
requirements in the first master plan. In the second master plan, investment 
requirements were established and made possible by Interagua.  
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When Interagua started to work in Guayaquil new forms of cooperation 
were developed since the engineers from Interagua together with local 
engineers and people in the field were going to work together. As one of the 
Interagua representatives explained, this showed a knowledge gap between 
the two groups and a transmission of knowledge had to take place. The local 
engineers lacked technical skills and knowledge. One example is that they 
could not measure the accurate water flows or take water samples. In order 
to know the water levels before 2001, they used to call the hospitals in 
Guayaquil in order to get a confirmation of the water levels and pressure. If 
the hospitals said that the levels or pressure were low, the local engineers 
could open the water vaults and distribute more water. Another example is 
that people in the south parts of Guayaquil, who suffered the most from the 
insufficient water services, installed their own connections in order to get 
water. Due to lack of knowledge, the people drilled into the sewage water 
pipes or down to the soil water and took up this water for cooking and 
drinking without knowing where it came from but thought it was better than 
nothing. One of the Interagua representatives stated that this was a “chaotic 
way to operate” during this time. When Interagua started to work with local 
engineers in Guayaquil they could for the first time create maps of pressure 
and flow, replace fragile pipes made of metal or cement with plastic 
materials and repair the worst leaks.  
 
In 2007 the first water samples in the south of Guayaquil could be taken. 
The improvements have continued since, and Interagua works in different 
areas of the city at the time. When the most critical problems in one area are 
taken care of, they move on to the next area because the problems there are 
more urgent. Hence, there is still a need of improvements since everything 
is not taken care of even though it has reached an acceptable level in most 
sectors. They mentioned that water losses in the systems are still high and 
estimated to 56% and that up to 100 kilometres of the pipelines has to be 
“rehabilitated” or changed. However, if looking at the overall situation in 
Guayaquil it has gotten a lot better compared to the time before 2001. The 
Interagua representatives stated that they have gone from 240 000 to 
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550 000 water connections (meaning that the number of taps connected to 
the water distribution network have more than doubled), reached a 
continuity of service in Guayaquil and that the water coming to the 
households in the tap is potable without treatment.  
 
EMAPAG-EP and Interagua have a lot of contact with each other and both 
of them confirm that good relations are important. Both actors take water 
samples (EMAPAG-EP does it as a part of the control function of Interagua) 
and share material and statistics with each other. However, the main 
differences between the two are that Interagua mainly has contact with 
EMAPAG-EP, whereas EMAPAG-EP has contact with other authorities and 
governmental organizations e.g. ARCA, Agencia de Regulación y Control 
del Agua and SENAGUA, Secretaría del Agua.
7
 One of the representatives 
from Interagua wondered if a more direct contact with the governmental 
authorities would be beneficial for the transmission of information. 
 
Furthermore, Interagua can suggest improvements and new projects, but it is 
EMAPAG-EP who in the end decides what is going to be implemented and 
with what economical sources. This is regulated in the concession contract, 
the five year long master plans as well as by the current political decisions. 
EMAPAG-EP is according to the Ley de Transparencia (Transparency 
Law) forced to provide documents and statistics to the public, whereas 
Interagua is not since it is a private company.  
 
Since EMAPAG-EP is the regulating body it has a strong influence on what 
Interagua can do. One example of this control function is that EMAPAG-EP 
can fine Interagua if they do not reach the requirements in the master plans. 
Also as earlier mentioned, it is EMAPAG-EP and not Interagua that has 
contact with other authorities, and can by that influence the political 
decisions regarding water management in Guayaquil. The most outstanding 
example of this is that it is EMAPAG-EP who approves the water tariff that 
                                                          
7
 ARCA and SENAGUA are two of the authorities on a governmental level and hence on a 
higher level than EMAPAG-EP, who is on a municipal level (ARCA, 2018. EMAPAG-EP, 
2018 A. SENAGUA, 2018).   
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Interagua can charge the households (this is regulated in the concession 
contract). According to the Interagua representatives, EMAPAG-EP has 
reduced the tariff and kept it low for the last couple of years. That water is 
cheap is confirmed both by the households and also by the representative 
from EMAPAG-EP who believes that water in Guayaquil is cheaper than 
anywhere else in Ecuador. It is explained as being a way of subsidizing 
water to gain votes in the upcoming elections since EMAPAG-EP is a 
public company with possibilities to affect politics. Another explanation is 
that the households would react negatively if the tariff was raised and by 
keeping the tariff low the households are possibly more pleased. Due to this, 
the Interagua representatives points out a weakness in the concession 
contract: If Interagua wants to implement new projects in order to improve 
the water services even further, more money would be needed and the 
investments and economic support approved by EMAPAG-EP. One of the 
Interagua representatives stated that they have been able to detect all the 
problems and come up with solutions for them - it is only the financial 
means that is restricting them from solving these problems. One way to 
allow it and increase the budget would be to raise the water tariff for the 
households, but instead the opposite is done. Hence, the Interagua 
representatives alleged that the potential efficiency is not recognized in the 
concession contract and master plans.  
 
The representatives from Interagua argued that the tap water they provide is 
potable, and that they drink it themselves without further treatment. Why 
people in Guayaquil still do not do the same they believe has to do with the 
household‟s lack of information about Interagua and their cleaning 
processes as well as that the old perception that there is a need to boil the 
water still persists. The representatives argued that they would like to do 
more campaigns in order to change this and spread information about that 
the tap water is potable. However, they explained that Interagua is regulated 
by the concession contract and its budget, which means that it is not 
possible at the moment. Also, together with EMAPAG-EP they have done 
campaigns in the past, but since the tap water was announced as potable but 
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people who drank it become sick, there is currently a fear for letting this 
type of information out. Because of the risk of losing trust and creating a 
negative reputation, EMAPAG-EP is more restrictive about this due to its 
role as a regulator of Interagua. This fear is justified since Interagua also has 
a fear of cutting or connecting wrong pipes when working on the 
improvements of the distributions system. There is still a lot of information 
missing and the old maps of the distribution system do not always correlate 
with the real pipes found in the ground. 
 
Both EMAPAG-EP and Interagua has stated that they do not have any 
contact with the sellers of water purification systems coming from the 
private companies. One of the representatives from Interagua stated that it 
would not be a surprise if the sellers use false information in order to sell 
their products. Also, he argued that due to the lack of knowledge and the old 
perceptions, people might believe that the water is contaminated in the 
pipes. However, he mentioned that the problem might rather be in the 
cisternas than in the pipes, since the former are seldom cleaned properly. 
This could cause the contamination of the water distributed by Interagua to 
the households. Since the cisternas are the households own property, the 
households have to have sufficient knowledge on how to clean them. The 
representative from Interagua stated that they offer cleaning services of the 
cisternas to the households, but that households can also clean it 
themselves. The representative from EMAPAG-EP also confirmed this 
picture and argued that Interagua is responsible for cleaning and distributing 
the water to people‟s houses, but if the cisternas are not cleaned properly, it 
can cause contamination that the house owner him/herself is responsible for. 
 
Both Interagua and EMAPAG-EP aim at providing clean tap water and to 
sustain the continuity of water services in Guayaquil. The concession 
contract is valid for 30 years, and by the time of this study, the 
representatives interviewed stated that they do not know what will happen 
after this period of time. Both entities confirmed that concession contracts 
are not allowed anymore in Ecuador due to political decisions taken after 
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2009, and hence an extension of the current concession contract is not 
possible according to current legislation. 
3. Discussion
The sum of the narratives from the three target groups present a complex 
water situation in Guayaquil where different explanations, arguments and 
imagined thruths regarding the households„ potential access to potable water 
are included. What stand out are the uncertainty, lack of information and 
trust that exist among the households in relation to the sellers of water 
purification systems, to Interagua and the state. This is true for the sellers 
too since they present different and often vague information and 
explainations about the water in Guayaquil. In addition, there seems to be a 
lack of communication between the governing actors, the households and 
the sellers which cause several concequences. 
3.1 Understanding the households 
The narratives and the households„ behavior shows that the households do 
not reflect on or worry about the water situation, unless there are problems 
with either the access to or the state of the water, or if they are approached 
by a seller. Their pre-reflexive strategies and perceptions of obtaining 
potable water, i.e their practical consciousness (Giddens, 1986), is part of a 
habitual pattern and based on previous experiences and understandings of 
the water situation (cf. Bourdieu, 1990. Giddens, 1986). This means that the 
households„ strategies to access clean water are schemes of routines and the 
majority of the households do not discursively question these strategies. 
Even if the strategies are different (e.g. some buy purification systems 
whereas others boil their water for a few minutes up to an hour) or people 
practice a specific strategy but can not explain why, the individual 
household do not doubt the validity of their own strategy. 
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However, when water problems occur (e.g. the potable water is mixed with 
sewage water or the water distribution is turned off due to reparation work 
in the area) which are not solved by the everyday routines, the households 
are forced to reflect and question their strategies, considering why the 
routines do not work as assumed and what type of information is needed in 
order to secure the water supply. Hence, the new strategies and practices are 
reflected on and become part of the household„s discursive consciousness 
(Giddens, 1986). The same thing happens when the sellers enters the 
households: The households have to reflect on the state of water quality and 
their strategies to secure clean tap water, thus clearly tackling the problem 
discursively by reflecting on how to solve the problem and how previous 
strategies have been functioning. By doing so, they have to decide if they 
ought to buy a purification system or not. This is in line with what Giddens 
(1986) refers to as rationalisation of action and reflexive monitoring. It 
means that the households have to, in a rational way, scrutinize their water 
strategies when being approached by a seller. This leads to a reflexive 
thinking or monitoring of these strategies and it comes into mind since they 
are being reminded of their current strategy as well as alternative strategies 
when the interaction with the sellers takes place (Giddens, 1986). This also 
means that the households must draw on and reflect on their previous 
understanding of the water situation in order to (re-) evaluate the current 
situation, which can lead to a new understanding of the situation and hence 
perhaps a change in the use of the strategies for obtaining potable water. We 
are here presented with a hermeneutic circle of understanding (cf. Alvesson 
and Sköldberg, 2009). 
 
The outcome of a sales meeting depends on how the household views itself 
and what type of arguments the sellers bring. If the household sees itself as 
well grounded in the topic they can demonstrate their knowledge and 
agency, their “continuous flow of conduct“ regarding water strategies, and 
hence approach the sellers‟ arguments (Giddens, 1986, p. 55). This would 
then imply that they rationally can explain why they act as they do and 
demonstrate that their strategy of obtaining potable water is better than the 
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strategy that the seller suggests. If not, it is likely that the sellers will have a 
strong influence on the household‟s decision making. 
In addition, according to Giddens (1986) the rationalisation of action and an 
actor„s competence is judged by others. This is true for the household-seller 
interaction since the sellers evaluate and judge the households and the 
knowledge they possess. If a seller judges a household as less competent 
with little knowledge and poor judgement, they will approach it in a 
different way compared to if they judge the household as more competent. 
The result of this is that sellers have different arguments and prepare 
differently when meeting with different households. Sellers in this study 
have explicitly said that it is easier to sell to households that lack (or as I 
also see it, do not demonstrate) knowledge. On the contrary, the 
rationalisation of action and an evaluation is also done by the households 
when they judge the sellers„ arguments and information. The result of this 
evaluation is seen in the three responses presented earlier: 
1. People who believe the sellers and hence buy the purification
systems.
2. People who believe the sellers but think that the purification systems
are unnecessary or too expensive and hence continue to practice
another strategy.
3. People who do not believe the sellers and hence do not buy the
purification systems.
If there is a true need for the purification systems seems to be left aside 
since the sellers lack the ability to in a detailed way explain how the water is 
cleaned by the systems, what contaminants are removed and what properties 
the water has when it is delivered by Interagua to start with. Also, the sellers 
confirm that they do not have any contact with with Interagua or EMAPAG-
EP who are the main actors providing statistics and data about water quality. 
Therefore it is difficult to understand where the sellers„ information comes 
from or what source they have based their arguements on. 
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Several people from the households have described themselves as lazy and 
without interest in the water question, e.g. by not searching for updated 
information. At the same time Interagua does not reach out to their 
customers with information about the water improvements and EMAPAG-
EP that regulates Interagua„s concession rights have a fear of letting out 
information due to negative experiences from the past. This means that the 
source of much of the information about water that reaches the households 
derives from the sellers, and it is up to the households alone to evaluate this 
type of information. Also, since the companies that sell the purification 
systems are not constrained by any specific regulations or controls except 
the import regulations, there is no control function of their information. 
Even if the sellers want to take on an educational role, much of their 
commercial interests shines through and their information is often biased 
due to the following reasons: 
 
- The sellers approach specific areas in Guayaquil where they know 
that water problems currently exist. Therefore the chance of finding 
households that are aware of the water problems and hence in a 
position to change their current water strategy, e.g. by buying a 
purification system, is likely to be found. 
 
- They facilitate the purchases by offering payment plans and 
discounts. 
 
- Their work is commission based which means the more a seller sells, 
the more money he or she can earn which creates a personal 
incentive for sales.  
 
- Their educational background involves sales techniques and 
marketing strategies. 
 
This makes the households vulnerable to the sellers‟ arguments, especially 
to the technical sellers‟ arguments. When it comes to the emotional seller, 
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the knowledge gap and strong sale techniques are concealed, since the 
recommendation for purification systems comes from someone that the 
people in the household already know. Hence, there is no need to build up a 
bond of trust to this type of seller and the potential to question the seller‟s 
arguments is very limited. This may also suggest that the households 
demonstrate a higher degree of trust for family and friends in comparison to 
the trust they have for the governing authorities or sellers and the 
information they provide regarding water issues (Blind, 2006. World Bank, 
2010. Lafuente et. al. 2012). 
The water situation in Guayaquil has improved substantially since 2001, and 
according to Interagua, the tap water is now potable. However, people from 
various households have said that they still use several strategies to try to 
purify the tap water before drinking it. This can be explained by an 
understanding based on previous experiences and a collective memory since 
people continue to act in the same way as they did when the water situation 
was a lot worse than it is today (e.g. compare before and after the 
concession contract was written). The trust for the governing actors and 
their information is not high, which is also a contributing factor of why it is 
difficult to change the perception of these actors and the water 
improvements they have done. In the case of water in Guayaquil it seems 
that people have never trusted the water system or the authorities‟ will and 
ability to provide potable water directly to the tap. People have also been 
taught from their childhood to always try to purify the water. Interagua and 
EMAPAG-EP have demonstrated that they want to change this. If they are 
able to do so in the future it could lead to a transformation of the 
households‟ water strategies, since it might disrupt people‟s tendency to 
interpret the present situation of potable water by drawing on previous 
experiences (Inglis, 2012). The reason why the governing actors have so far 
not been able to change the situation is explained by the fact that there are 
still remaining problems with water distribution and the responsible actors 
have not been able to provide clean and potable water continuously. As also 
mentioned, there is a lack of trust and information, which make the 
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households maintain their belief that there is a need for purifying and 
treating the water. Drawing form Giddens‟ theory of structuration one could 
argue that trustworthy information and a visible change in the water 
management could possibly lead to a social transformation of the old ideas 
and present strategies (Giddens, 1986. Inglis, 2012). However, in the 
situation today there is too little trustworthy and accessible information in 
order for this transformation to fully take place. The combination of the 
abovmentioned factors open up space for the private sellers of water 
purification systems to allude to old perceptions and ideas about unclean 
water in order to make profit by arguing that there is a need for their 
products. 
3.2 Governmentality in Guayaquil’s water market 
As stated in the beginning of this thesis, Interagua is part of the French 
owned consulting firm Veolia. Veolia is one of the dominating companies in 
the private water market in the world today (Sjölander Holland, 2005). 
Starting at the very top, this means that Interagua is governed by a big 
company with a strong market position and economic power behind its 
actions. It might therefore not come as a surprise that Interagua won the 
concession contract with little competition in 2001. When signing the 
concession contract and writing the five year long master plans it has hence 
been of great importance to have a national regulator that can control and 
govern what Interagua is doing and match the role as a powerful actor. This 
position is the one that EMAPAG-EP has been given and I will argue that 
this role is important for the governing, because ultimately, it is EMAPAG-
EP that decides on the direction for development of water distribution and 
infrastructure in Guayaquil. In this framing Interagua is just an executor.  
Examples of EMAPAG-EP‟s control function and governing of Interagua is 
seen in that the former body decides which of the projects will be approved 
and with what economical means. EMAPAG-EP can fine Interagua if they 
consider that Interagua has not reached the goals in the agreements. This is a 
type of governing that also includes exercising power by using fines as a 
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threat or punishment. One example of where this has been put to practice 
was when EMAPAG-EP fined Interagua 5 million US dollars for not 
finishing work with the sewage systems according to one of the agreed 
master plans (PSIRU, 2018). 
 
One aspect that seems to be crucial in the governing of Interagua is that it is 
EMAPAG-EP that decides the water tariff for the households that Interagua 
can charge. Frustration over low water tariffs has been expressed by the 
interviewees from Interagua, since the efficiency and the potential of the 
concession contract might not be recognized when a low tariff is set. If there 
was more money, the distribution system and infrastructure would be 
improved faster and perhaps there would be more money for doing 
campaigns in order to inform the households about the improved water 
situation. On the other hand, EMAPAG-EP is by this decree assuring that 
water prices cannot increase. This has various implications: A situation like 
the Water War in Cochabamba is not likely to happen, at least not as long as 
the water tariff is kept low and people are still able to pay. EMAPAG-EP 
probably knows this, and by keeping the tariff low they can avoid a strong 
civil reaction or dissatisfaction among the people. This is a strategy used by 
EMAPAG-EP to enforce its role as a regulator since the governing of 
Interagua means that Interagua cannot do massive improvements which in 
the end could become very costly for the households. The low water tariff is 
appreciated by the households, but it can also be used as a tool in politics 
since people are more likely to vote for an actor or politician that suggests 
low water tariffs. It also means that EMAPAG-EP in their governing creates 
the imagination that water supply is cheap and it might be argued that the 
full value of water delivery is not fully recognized by the citizens. At the 
same time, EMAPAG-EP seems to improve the access to water or at least 
gives the impression of it, since Interagua and their expertise are contracted 
and improvements of the water distribution system done, even if the pace is 
slower than Interagua would wish for. 
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EMAPAG-EP‟s role is crucial. They balance between making 
improvements and at the same time keeping the people happy and able to 
pay. In the making of these two actions, they are governing both Interagua 
and the households in Guayaquil. The concession contract itself is the 
physical symbol of this governance. Also, since it is them and not Interagua 
that has a direct contact with other authorities they can control the flow of 
information to and from these authorities. Thus, EMAPAG-EP has a strong 
influence over the political and economic governance linked to the water 
situation in Guayaquil. However, since it is Interagua that has most of the 
direct contacts with the households, much of EMAPAG-EP‟s governing and 
influence is not known to the households. As earlier stated, several 
individuals from the interviews do not even know that EMAPAG-EP exists.  
Interagua can also be said to have a strong influence, but on another arena 
than EMAPAG-EP, since they are more linked to technical governance due 
to their technical superiority. As an example, when Interagua‟s work started 
in 2001 there was a big knowledge gap between the local engineers and 
Interagua‟s engineers (according to the representatives from EMAPAG-EP 
and Interagua). Since the engineers were going to work together to improve 
the water supply facilities, a transmission of knowledge had to take place. 
With the aim to bring technical skills and knowledge, Interagua governed 
how this was going to be done since the local engineers lacked the sufficient 
knowledge of how to improve the water services. This means that the 
knowledge transmission has been part of Interagua‟s governance. This poses 
the question if an improvement of the water situation in Guayaquil could 
have taken place without this technical governance or influence from 
Interagua. It is not in the scope of this thesis to evaluate this question, but it 
is possible that this is one of the main reasons for the privatization i.e. that a 
better technical governance than what EMAPAG-EP could provide before 
2001 was needed and it was looked for in the private (and neoliberal) sector. 
Another important aspect is that Interagua is the actor that has the main 
contact with the households, e.g. when it comes to payment of the water 
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tariff, announcements about water cuts and information about 
improvements. Interagua‟s contacts with the households influences the 
households‟ water strategies and practices, disciplinging the households‟ 
water access and purification behavior. However, so far Interagua has failed 
in the governing when it comes to change the people‟s perception of the 
water supply: the majority still questions that the water situation has 
improved and that the tap water is potable. The question one has to ask is 
how these perceptions can be changed when the information is restricted 
and a fear of letting out information exists (as both EMAPAG-EP and 
Interagua confirm is the case). 
EMAPAG-EP might be quite happy with the current situation, as people are 
satisfied with the low water tariffs but at the same time people see 
Interagua‟s presence and are taught that improvements are done. This boosts 
the popular image of EMAPAG-EP, which enables the government to divert 
discontent and anger with the malfunctioning water supply system away 
from themselves. Also, it is Interagua who is likely to be blamed when 
water problems occur since they are working with the technical parts out on 
the field and hence more visible for the citizens. As a conclusion, 
EMAPAG-EP‟s governance can be seen as follows: It can have a specific 
intention towards a desired outcome i.e. keeping the people happy and 
making them vote for a specific type of politics. At the same time it means 
that they are doing their job as the regulator since they, in a rational and 
controlled way, regulate another actor, namely Interagua. 
Governance includes the shaping of human conduct, and therefore has 
implications for action and freedom (Dean, 2009). In the sale situations this 
is visible since the private sellers promote their purification systems by 
demonstrating why they are needed, i.e. trying to govern the households‟ 
actions and how they percieve the water supply situation. This is done in a 
straight forward and deliberate manner by presenting arguments and reasons 
that sound trustworthy and true. However, the gap between knowledge and 
propaganda makes it very hard for the households to decide the best course 
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of action. At present, the information from the sellers is highly questionable 
and biased (due to their personal incentives of selling the products and 
making money as well as their inability to explain how their products 
actually clean the tap water) and the information from EMAPAG-EP or 
Interagua is almost non-exisiting (or there is lack of trust for using this 
information). This means that the households‟ options for decision and 
action become both limited and uncertain and they have to try to find the 
answers and correct information themselves. People in the interviews have 
refered to themselves as lazy, but perhaps what they do is that they blame 
themselves for their lack of knowledge and inability to make rational 
decisions. 
 
Due to the fact that information is missing or is incomplete, and old 
perceptions of contaminated tap water still exist, I have gotten the 
impression that the sellers have an interest in keeping this picture alive. The 
sellers know about these old perceptions and that people still draw from past 
experiences and they can promote their products easier if they confirm the 
picture about the water that the households already have. The 
sellers‟governance is therefore seen in the sales meeting since they try to 
convince the household members to buy their products. 
 
3.3 What does privatization mean? 
Since the ideology of neo-liberalism promotes commodification of public 
goods, free trade, free markets as well as less involvement from the state, I 
would like to argue that neo-liberal ideas are present in the water market in 
Guayaquil. By having a strong international market actor in resource 
management, Interagua gained the concession contract with little 
competition. Veolia is French owned but due to globalisation and their 
dominating position in the international market they could enter the local 
market in Guayaquil by operating the company Interagua. Entering this 
market has had various implications which will be explained in this chapter. 
The private sellers of water purification systems have also entered the local 
water market due to the process of globalisation since the companies in 
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Guayaquil function as intermediaries for bigger companies outside Ecuador. 
These intermediary companies have an interest in making profit and it is 
possible for them to pursue this due to the lack of information and the 
uncertainty that the households in Guayaquil experience as earlier 
discussed. However, this part of the discussion will focus on Interagua and 
EMAPAG-EP since they can be said to be part of the private water market 
on a higher and more political level than the private companies and sellers 
e.g. by being affected by current legistlation in Ecuador, the concession 
contract itself as well as having contact with other national autorities who 
are related to water questions.  
 
Looking at the power of the state, Interagua„s entrance into the water market 
has decreased the power of the local authority EMAPAG-EP. By the 
concession contract Interagua and EMAPAG-EP are now referred to as the 
two governing actors operating on the same level and in the same space, 
even if they have different roles as operator and regulator respectively. 
However, when looking at the larger picture, the water market now holds 
more private interests than before and it can be argued that a neo-liberal 
governmentality is a new element in this market, caused by Interagua„s 
appearance on the water supply stage (cf. Ferguson and Gupta, 2002).  
 
Wallerstein (2006) argues that sellers within a captitalistic market economy 
(not specifically in Guayaquil, but in a general sense) prefer to create a 
monopoly if they can since it would boost their profit. Pure monopolies can 
be difficult to create, but not so called quasi-monopolies. Wallerstein (2006) 
means that quasi-monopolies can be created by support of the state and 
reserved rights or patents which can be signed for a specific number of 
years. By applying this idea to the case of Guayaquil one can see that 
Interagua has created a type of quasi-monopoly (or even a monopoly as it 
has been referred to by the interviewees) on the water market and have 
specific rights through the concession contract with a validity of 30 years. 
The question here is how willing the state, in the form of EMAPAG-EP, 
was to contract Interagua. There are two main explanations that can 
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contribute to an understanding of this: 
 
1. Due to the chaotic water situation in Guayaquil before 2001 
EMAPAG-EP had to do something since their own governing and 
technical knowledge were not enough. There was a lack of 
regulation and control and they could not guarantee a continuous 
flow of water to the households. Therefore the creation of a quasi-
monopoly and contracting a private actor was initiated and had 
support from the state due to the fact that EMAPAG-EP ran out of 
alternatives of how to improve the situation alone.   
 
2. Due to a strong pressure from international institutions like the 
World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (who 
granted loans for the privatization) it was difficult for EMAPAG-EP 
to abstain from contracting Interagua. As a governmental body with 
smaller economical means compared to international actors with 
large economic power, EMAPAG-EP was run over in a situation 
where they were in need of support and alternatives. Having 
Interagua as the only company bidding for the concession contract 
did offer a solution, but not many alternatives.  
 
Due to its position as a private company, Interagua wants to make profit. 
That probably explains why they want to raise the water tariffs for the 
households in Guayaquil and argue that the concession contract do not 
recognize efficiency. Even if the cooperation with EMAPAG-EP runs 
smoothly, Interagua would probably do more investments, raise the water 
tariffs and be more profitable if EMAPAG-EP was not regulating them or 
had a weaker position. Because of this, EMAPAG-EP‟s role is important as 
mentioned earlier. However, when it comes to the aspect of making money 
Interagua showed an interest for the water market in Guayaquil specifically. 
It has been argued that private companies strategically choose where to 
engage in business due to the interest of making profit (Bratton and 
Denham, 2014. Swyngedouw, 2005. Wallerstein, 2006). Swyngedouw 
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(2005, p. 95) calls it “cherry picking“ and Bratton and Denham (2014, p.14) 
argues that “the portability of capital in the era of globalization makes it 
possible for multinational corporations to select their production location in 
an endlessly variable geometry of profit searching“. This could perhaps 
explain why a privatization has taken place in Guayaquil and not in smaller 
cities in Ecuador because entering the water markets there has simply not 
been considered big or profitable enough.  
 
Veolia operates on a global scale and can therefore select a market where 
accumulation of capital and profit making is easy (cf. Wallerstein, 2006). In 
this case, capital is moved from Guayaquil to other geographical locations 
due to Veolia„s global and dominating market position and since the 
concession contract is valid for a long period of time and difficult to break. 
Swyngedouw (2005) has argued that privatization leads to accumulation by 
dispossession since the control from the state is moved to the private sector 
(which is in this case global and outside Ecuador) which gives the private 
sector a stronger influence over local resources. By this shift it becomes 
possible to profit from resources and also to move the profit to new 
locations. Linking Harvey‟s (2006) views of accumulation by dispossession 
to this reasoning means that this shift in governance possibly can, on a 
larger and broader scale, lead to uneven geographical development. How 
much of an uneven gegraphical development is taking place in Guayaquil in 
relation to other places in the world is difficult to estimate and not in the 
scope of this thesis. However, accumulation by dispossession is seen in 
Guayaquil concidering how the concession contract was formulated and the 
fact that many of the workers from EMAPAG-EP were dismissed from their 
jobs but later rehired or trained by Interagua (Swyngedouw, 2004). 
Interagua has influenced the local engineers by their technology of 
governance and transmission of knowledge, in other words appropriating 
assets like labour force and knowledge management. Also, a concession 
contract in itself gives the rights to the private actor to operate and improve 
the water infrastructure. It can therefore be said that infrastructure is another 
asset that Interagua has taken control of (i.e. “appropriated“ or 
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“accumulated“), since they are in charge over it. This is a problematic 
situation since the concession contract makes it partly legal for Interagua to 
accumulate assets in this way and gain money, control and power and move 
profit to places outside Ecuador.  
 
In addition, Harvey (2006, p. 95) means that a fundamental characteristic of 
capital accumulation is that “technological change (or “progress“) is 
inevitable and accepted as a good in itself“. Harvey‟s words are applicable 
in the case of Guayaquil‟s water market since EMAPAG-EP had to contract 
Interagua if they wanted to improve the water situation and it has from both 
actors been said to be beneficial for the development to do so. On the other 
hand, this means that the shift from publically owned water services to 
private ones ultimately has had an undertone of capitalism and neo-
liberalism, but it seems to be acceptable and even positive according to the 
interviewees from EMAPAG-EP and Interagua. Furthermore, information 
and data about water is to a greater extent than before in the hands of private 
actors (Interagua and Veolia) who do not have to share this information with 
other actors. Information can thus be partly relased, hidden, influenced or 
twisted.  
 
The privatization of the water supply system in Guayaquil has made water 
become a commodity with a price tag on an international market. Here, 
transnational corporations are active, profiting on the low capacity of water 
services and the distorted and insufficient information to private households 
has contributet to transform water users to water customers (Swyngedouw, 
2005). The Sustainable Development Goal number six states: “Access to 
safe water and sanitation and sound management of freshwater ecosystems 
are essential to human health and to environmental sustainability and 
economic prosperity“ (UN, 2017, p. 8).  An important question to pose is if 
an attempt to achieve this goal and provide clean, potable water, shall 
involve private actors with an interest in making profit of such a vital 
resource. 
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4. Conclusion
The privatization of the water market in Guayaquil has led to improvements 
in terms of water treatment and distribution if one compares with the 
situation before the concession contract was signed. Therefore, the 
concession contract can in this aspect be seen something positive. However, 
contracting a private company like Interagua with connections to the 
international company Veolia has meant that neo-liberal ideas and profit 
seeking has become part of this development. As discussed, this has meant 
that Interagua has gained money, assets and power whereas the same has 
decreased for the state owned regulator EMAPAG-EP. The increase of 
private interests in the water market in Guayaquil is evident, both on a 
higher political level where control is possible i.e. by the concession 
contract between EMAPAG-EP and Interagua. It is also evident in the non-
political arena where there is a lack of such control, as in the cases of the 
private companies and their sellers. Due to that there are still problems with 
the water supply in Guayaquil, as well as old perceptions and a lack of new 
information about tap water, a space for the private sellers to operate in is 
created. This means that there is a continued uncertainty for the households 
in Guayaquil when it comes to understanding the tap water situation and 
what sources of information are available and trustworthy. As a result, the 
households practice many different strategies in order to make sure that they 
can obtain what they see as clean and potable water. 
EMAPAG-EP‟s role as a regulator has in this case study been pointed out as 
important since they govern Interagua, and there are thus possibilities to 
influence the direction for development. EMAPAG-EP also governs the 
people, which means that they can guide them with a specific intention or 
towards a desired outcome. In this case it might have concequences for 
politics e.g. that people vote for a specific political cause. It can also mean 
that, since the water tariffs are currently low, a perception of that water and 
water related services are cheap is being created. In addition, since the 
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governing actors have failed in providing sufficient information about the 
tap water to the households, the old perceptions about it still persist. In the 
end of the 30 year period of the concession contract it would be interesting 
to see if the knowledge gap has been bridged and improvements done in the 
whole of Guayaquil, since this could implicate that the space for the private 
sellers to operate in would diminish. This would probably lead to a better 
water security and improved knowledge about tap water for the individual 
households. 
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6. Appendix 1
Figure 3: Map over Guayaquil with a marking “X” where the households 
in the case study live. Source: EMAPAG-EP (2018 B), with “X” put by 
Josephine Biro.   
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Figures 4-5: Pictures of tap water after a seller has performed a 
demonstration with a device in a sales meeting to show the level of 
contamination. Photo: Josephine Biro. 
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Figuers 6-8: Taps, tanks and purifications systems that are used by 
households in Guayaquil. Photos: Josephine Biro. 
